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Abstract 
 
There is a growing trend across the world to adopt Performance Based 
Contracting strategies to support logistics systems. Using these policies, contract 
payments are strongly related to the performance achieved compared to prespecified 
metrics. However, managers are not always confident on what are the most suitable 
performance goals to use in these agreements. As a consequence, contractors struggle to 
deliver the desired performance results, while aircraft fleets experience an increase in 
support costs. In addition, when the results are inadequate, leaders are tempted to impose 
even stricter performance targets to contractors, willing to exercise more control over the 
support organization.  
In this research, simulation is used to provide the quantitative evidence of how 
sensitive life support costs are to adding metrics to a Performance Based Contract, with a 
focus on changes in turnaround times and repair costs, for different logistical 
configurations. The study acknowledges the potential risk of adding intermediate metrics 
to these contracts, which possibly will only raise life support costs without a positive 
effect on the main objectives of a fleet: mission readiness or simply availability. Ultimate 
negative effects on contractors are also discussed and recommendations are provided to 
managers on how they could design more successful performance-based contracts.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Background  
Logistics support strategies have been shifted from transaction-based approaches, 
in which contractors are used to satisfy specific demands and receive pre-specified 
payments for their services, to Performance-Based Logistics (PBL), wherein a true 
partnership amongst costumer and contractor must take place, which would bring benefits 
to both parties.  
PBL has developed as a strategy for enhancing the performance and reducing the 
cost to sustain complex systems during the post production phase of their life-cycle, 
which often tops, by two or three times, the expenses verified in the development and 
production phases (Randall et al., 2010). While many papers use PBL as a synonym for 
Performance-Based Contracting (PBC), the latter technically refer to an instrument to 
achieve the former. PBC is a method of contracting designed to ensure that the essential 
levels of quality of performance are achieved and their payments are related to the degree 
to which the results meet the criteria of the contract (U.S. Department of Defense, 2016). 
Across the world, there is a growing trend a to adopt Performance Based 
Contracting strategies to support logistics systems, so that contract payments are strongly 
related to the performance achieved compared to prespecified metrics. Nevertheless, 
managers are not always convinced on what are the most appropriate performance goals 
to use in such agreements. Consequently, contractors struggle to provide the required 
performance outcomes, whilst aircraft fleets may face an increase in support costs. 
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The current preferred product maintenance strategy to improve Department of 
Defense (DoD) weapon systems readiness is the PBL (Gardner et al., 2015). At the same 
time, there is evidence of decreasing performance in USAF mission-capable rates, as can 
be seen in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. USAF Mission Capable Rates 2014-2017 - Adapted from Losey (2018) 
  
Figure 2. USAF Budget FY 2013-2020 - Adapted from Air Force Magazine (2019) 
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In addition, Figure 2 reveals that, in recent years, not only has the budget for 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) grown in absolute numbers, but its share has also 
been reduced in relation to the total budget, indicating pressure for the use of an 
increasingly smaller slice of available resources in sustainment activities.  
Faced with this challenging scenario, an opportunity arises to discuss possible 
reasons for these obstacles that are being encountered. Therefore, in this study potential 
issues regarding Performance-Based Contracting will be clarified, given the major role 
that this approach plays in the maintenance of these combat platforms. 
Problem Statement  
In Performance-Based Contracting, results are driven by high-level goals 
discussed before the contract was established. But when the results provided by PBC are 
inadequate, logistics managers are tempted to enforce even more performance targets to 
contractors, eager to exercise more influence over the support structure. 
Given the complexity inherent in the logistics chain of an aircraft fleet, it is 
impossible to have a clear idea of the effects of such potential changes, and considering 
the high-pressure environment and the permanent search for better and faster results, 
these consequences may be overlooked. Therefore, leaders need beforehand to have a 
general knowledge about the mechanisms related to this type of event, enabling more 
appropriate and well-founded decisions. 
For this reason, the objective of this research is to provide evidence of how 
sensitive life support costs can be to adding metrics to a Performance-Based Contract, 
here focusing on changes in turnaround times and repair costs, for different logistical 
configurations. The study will acknowledge the potential risk of adding intermediate 
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metrics to these contracts, while also debating eventual negative effects on contractors. 
At last, recommendations will be provided to managers on how they could design more 
successful performance-based contracts. 
Research Questions  
In order to achieve the proposed objectives of this research, the following 
research questions are offered: 
Research Question (RQ): How sensitive are the Life Support Costs to the addition 
of metrics in a Performance Based Contract? 
Investigative Question 1 (IQ1): How does imposing a metric on the maximum 
turn-around time to repair a component affect LSC? 
Investigative Question 2 (IQ2): Are these possible effects more sensitive in 
specific logistic configurations? 
Methodology  
Simulation will be used in this research to fulfill the objective of providing 
quantitative evidence of how sensitive life support costs are to adding metrics to a 
Performance-Based Contract, with a focus on changes in turnaround times and repair 
costs, for different logistical configurations. 
The Swedish software OPUS10 was chosen as the tool for this purpose, 
considering its remarkable capabilities to model different support organizations and 
implement a wide range of logistical parameters, presenting as a main result something 
quite suitable for the objectives of this study: the cost/effectiveness curve, which will 
inform each of the configurations that will provide better availability results for a given 
life support cost. 
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Scope  
This study will only address some very specific logistics support structures, as 
will be discussed later, without using real data at any time. The goal here is to provide 
indications to substantiate a reasoning that can be applied in similar real-world cases, 
aiding to develop general concepts about the role metrics can play in Performance-Based 
Contracts. 
Assumptions and Limitations  
The simulation model will assume different logistics scenarios with an initial 
setup where the support organization is working with optimal performance for an 
availability level of 80%, which would hardly represent the real world, given the very 
dynamic environment in which an aircraft fleet is inserted, thus, it is unlikely that a 
logistics system will be operating optimally. 
Aircraft components will be the only items to fail in the model, but not the aircraft 
itself. Workshops (from contractors) will be the only sites allowed to repair them, so 
there will be no maintenance at the bases or depots, nor preventive or predictive 
inspections. The only station authorized to store components will be the depot, so nothing 
could be stocked on any base. Moreover, items will only be able to go up to the mother 
station - from base to depot, and from depot to workshop - and vice-versa. Consequently, 
there is no lateral support, nor cannibalization. Transportation times are considered fixed 
and the same for shipping and returning items between stations.  
Two sources of expenditures will sum up to calculate the life support costs 
simulation model: repair costs, occurring when an item in fixed at a workshop after its 
failure; and the acquisition costs, to purchase the necessary quantity of components to be 
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allocated in each logistical configuration, which will guarantee the system's capacity to 
reach the desired availability levels. Therefore, any other type of cost will not be included 
in this analysis, such as storage costs, man-hours costs, depreciation costs, or 
transportation costs. 
Finally, only certain values of changes in TAT and RC will be modeled. So, any 
other impact on the logistical configuration possibly caused by TAT reduction will not be 
considered, just the possible effect on repair costs. In actual situations, if the logistics 
system is operating with faster turnaround times, the depot will need to store fewer 
components, reducing storage cost, for example. However, these additional effects will 
not be taken into account in this study.  
Significance of Research  
Academia has plenty of research addressing Performance-Based Contracting, but 
most of them intend to debate their possible benefits compared to conventional support 
approaches. In addition to the smaller number of studies that evaluate the practical 
challenges of PBC, quantitative studies in these areas are also lacking. 
Thereby, this research will provide significant contribution helping to fill such 
gap, providing quantitative evidence about the intrinsic mechanisms associated with 
decisions on contract design, in order to offer measurable information to logistics leaders 
concerning the adjacent effects on life support costs that the unreasonable imposition of 
performance metrics can cause. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Performance Based Logistics  
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is currently the main strategy used by the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to enhance warfighter capability, reduce deployment 
footprint, and reduce the cost of ownership, presenting new opportunities and challenges 
(Coogan & Fellow, 2003). A more comprehensive definition from the DoD PBL 
Guidebook (2016) is provided below: 
PBL is an outcome-based support strategy that delivers an integrated, 
affordable product support solution that satisfies warfighter requirements 
while reducing Operating and Support (O&S) costs. When dealing with 
industry, product support outcomes are acquired through performance-based 
arrangements that deliver warfighter requirements and incentivize product 
support providers to reduce costs through innovation.  
Therefore, PBL is an instrument to combine acquisition and sustainment, applying 
the best business practices to achieve better performance, guarantee mission readiness 
and reduce costs. Data must be collected to ensure PBL attains the desired results, mainly 
regarding costs and desired performance.  
However, managers responsible for adopting such approach must be cautious, 
because despite its possible benefits, noticeable risks are always involved. In the words of 
Davis et al. (2016): “A PBL arrangement buys an affordable outcome that effectively 
supports the warfighter requirements... if the agreement is structured correctly”. 
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Drivers of PBL  
Among the reasons why customers decide to adopt PBL agreements, Berkowitz et 
al. (2003) list seven different factors, as given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Drivers for PBL – Adapted from Berkowitz et al. (2003)  
1. Rising cost of maintenance, operations and support for new and legacy missile systems 
2. Needed tool for Logistics Transformation and other actions required by Government 
3. Needed reduction of customer wait time in support of the warfighter 
4. Needed modernization of weapon systems to enhance combat capability 
5. Needed solutions to weapon obsolescence problems 
6. Documented savings from commercial logistics support operations 
7. Documented improvements from implementation of performance-based acquisition 
 
It is worth mentioning that, in fact, one of the main purposes for adopting this 
PBL strategy is that customers want to transfer the risk of output uncertainty to the 
service provider, in the form of contract payment uncertainty (Kim et al., 2010).  
The adoption of a PBL approach is mainly governed by the intention of aligning 
customer and supplier objectives and incentives. Meeting these concerns together can be 
tricky, though, especially when trying to align partners' views on risk and reward 
distribution. A critical point is the relationship between the possible benefits of this 
strategy and its costs, considering the possible design of complicated and expensive 
measurement systems (Selviaridis & Norrman, 2015). 
Total Cost of Ownership  
The adoption of a strategic purchasing focus has been stimulated by a series of 
recent trends that have focused on the quality of the purchase of materials and services, 
on the rationalization of the supply base and on stimulating competition. Increasingly, 
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decisions involving acquisitions affect a large part of a company's total costs, whether in 
terms of direct acquisition costs, but also in indirect costs, such as in the areas of 
inventory management, quality control, and administration in general. Total Cost of 
Ownership (TCO) is a tool to assess these indirect costs, establishing a more strategic 
focus on purchasing and supply management (Hurkens et al., 2006). 
When managing the logistics chain with a focus on TOC, it is possible to carry 
out strategic planning that allows synergy between private suppliers and service providers 
to meet military demands (Glas et al., 2013). Using this methodology, the negotiation of 
performance standards is broader, aiming not only to reduce costs but also the 
improvement of logistics performance factors, such as cycle times, hours needed for 
maintenance work or even time between failures. In addition to reducing TOC through 
lower amount of labor and inventories, the support system can also become more robust 
in the face of eventual contingencies (Camm et al., 2004). 
Therefore, complex logistical systems such as those related to military aircraft 
fleets must carry out their planning, not only by looking at individual cost entities, but 
using a TOC approach, which will allow the best global results to be obtained by making 
the sustainment structure more cost efficient. 
Life Cycle Costing  
The tool commonly used to establish TCO is called the Life Cycle Costing, which 
consists of a process of identifying and documenting all costs involved over the life of an 
asset. LCC is the sum of all types of expenses in support of an item from its conception 
and manufacture, throughout its operation, until the end of its useful life (Woodward, 
1997). 
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Expenses related to initial investments in a logistical support system correspond 
to only a small part of all operating costs that will be incurred during its life span. Thus, 
the life cycle technique is essential in Performance-Based Logistics, since, in general, an 
air force's fleets will operate for decades (Glas et al., 2013).  
The decrease in the life cycle cost can occur through the conversion of 
transactional expenses year by year, from traditional maintenance, into large cost 
reduction pools, which should be used to encourage investment in technology, material 
and process that increases the reliability of the system, while maintaining its 
performance. In a traditional approach, the customer generally does not have a capital 
reserve in the current year to invest in reliability improvements, even though the life 
cycle cost could present marked reductions (Nowicki et al., 2010). 
There are some differences between the categories used by each author to define 
the entire Life Cycle Cost. Figure 3 shows the formulation stated by Woodward (1997). 
 
Figure 3. Life Cycle Costing formulation (Woodward, 1997) 
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In other work, Bengtsson & Kurdve (2016) divided the LCC between project 
costs, acquisition costs, life support costs, and life operations costs. OPUS10 commonly 
uses as an output the life support costs (LSC), given by the expected investment and 
operating cost associated with the support system design (Hallin, 2015). 
Performance Based Contracting  
The literature uses a wide range of terms to refer to Performance-Based Logistics, 
sometimes Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) is used as a synonym of PBL. 
However, a more accurate and specific description is provided by (Hunter & Ellman, 
2017): 
Performance-based contracting is a type of contracting that calls for contracts 
to be structured in such a way as to enable and reward better performance on 
the part of the service provider or contractor. 
In this type of contract, a specific focus is given to the specifications, no longer 
ruling the processes of how the service will be executed, but rather emphasizing the 
expected results for the service, whether in financial terms or any other type of positive 
resulting impact. At least part of the supplier's payment must be linked to the 
achievement of a given metric, making the supplier subject to greater financial risks 
related to performance (Selviaridis & Norrman, 2015). 
Datta & Roy (2013) also discuss that in PBC the option is made not to acquire the 
possession of a product, but rather the result that it will bring. Therefore, compared to the 
traditional contracting process, PBC provides a better alignment between risks and 
incentives, and an adequate relationship between providers and customers is essential for 
the success of the contract. However, as the final requirement is for the result of the 
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service, it can be challenging to assess the quality of the service provided, associated with 
the difficulty of standardizing production due to the continuous involvement of the 
customer.  
Best Practices  
To fully meet the objectives of PBC, an accurate evaluation of current 
performance in measurable terms must first be made, differentiating overall performance 
in terms of Operational Availability (or some other expression of readiness) and a 
measure of life support costs. These general performance metrics can be broken down 
into lower-level metrics, such as reliability and supply lead times, and a clear definition 
of the performance required by the final user is needed. Consequently, an appropriate 
business type must define how to move performance from where it is to where it is 
required by the warfighter, being able to evaluate a wide range of business options, 
determining the cost and risk associated with each option. These options may involve 
providing all support elements, such as maintenance supply support, training, in-service 
engineering and technical documentation management. Finally, once the desired solution 
is chosen and employed, the performance of the entire support range must be measured, 
making the necessary modifications to accomplish the performance goals (Coogan & 
Fellow, 2003). 
A successful execution of a PBL agreement occurs through an iterative process, in 
which it is important to produce consistent reports, communicate regularly with major 
stakeholders and periodically review the performance of the contract. Some of the best 
practices related to managing these arrangements include: perform an opening meeting 
after contract award; ask for brief and informative contractor reports; quarterly review 
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meetings direct with contractor; flexibility with Governance processes as contract 
matures; understanding of PBL contract and contractor’s proposal; establishment of an 
internal PBL management team and a Governance plan with external stakeholders (U.S. 
DoD, 2016). 
The literature indicates some key ideas regarding the impact of measurements in 
the potential success of a PBL arrangement. Table 2 presents a set of prescriptions for 
measurement that could be used to guide PBC design decisions: 
Table 2: Measurement prescriptions for PBL agreements – Adapted from Doerr et al. (2004)  
1 
PBL should carry out less commercial sector participation if operational risk is 
high or difficult to measure. 
2 
The duration of the contract should be shorter when commercial sector providers 
undertake less (measurable) operational risk under contract. 
3 
Integrated weapon system models to support business case analysis should be used 
when a PBL contract cover less than comprehensive logistical support for a 
weapon system (e.g., for a component). 
4 
The metrics used for managing PBC should address valued outcomes and must be 
associated to the cost, readiness and agility of the weapons system. Process 
measures should be applied only when major operational decisions depend on the 
status of the process itself. 
5 
In ongoing PBL contracts, operational risk (variability) in key performance 
measures must be assessed, and variability reduction must be bolstered with 
proper incentives, when critical to mission support. 
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Incentive and Penalty Mechanisms  
Gardner et al. (2015) concluded that the DoD may balance PBL contracts to 
mitigate operational and financial risks, while simultaneously building long-term 
partnerships that encourage investment from commercial contractors, concentrating 
efforts in congressional funding methods (which are not compatible with PBL), using 
contract’s option years to provide more flexibility (and maybe flexible performance), 
improving incentives with increased use of profit sharing, making long-term contracts, 
and also working towards fixed price/price-based contracts. 
According to Datta & Roy (2013), contractor’s decision to share the cost of 
uncertainty with the sub-suppliers helps to form the basis of sustainable success of 
performance-based outsourcing contracts. 
There are three key findings in the research of Hunter & Ellman (2017) regarding 
incentives: contract length is the most powerful incentive; negative monetary incentives 
are effective, even down to the subcontractor level; positive monetary incentives are not 
seen as effective or desirable. 
Talking about how to incentivize or penalize a contractor, Wååk & Sturgess 
(2000) postulate that the adoption of penalty clauses requires good judgement, as the 
contract can be harmed if possible sanctions could induce the contractor to go out of 
business, given that in certain cases he would be the only one to be able to perform some 
type of service. Unreasonable application of sanctions in these situations can lead to 
unsolvable conflicts. The authors further suggest that the adoption of incentives should be 
preferred, such as, for example, increasing a payment if repair turnaround times are 
consistently hit. 
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Another important aspect about sanctions in PBC is presented in the study by 
Girth (2014), which states that the mere existence of contractual mechanisms to penalize 
the service provider is not enough to hold them accountable in case of poor performance. 
Among the factors that act against the accountability of the contract, the author points out 
the amount of discretion managers select to use, the level of administrative burden related 
with the sanction procedure, and the degree to which the purchasing organization is 
reliant on the poor-performing contractor's expertise. 
Determination of Good Metrics  
Defining a metric that translates warfighter objectives is a fundamental activity 
when choosing PBC. However, if such contracts are applied to specific subsystems or 
components, the metrics must be adjusted to reflect the correct level of responsibility 
delegated to the service provider, in order to seek the best consequence in the overall 
objective of the weapons system. Such metrics are used in PBC to measure and evaluate 
the effectiveness of the contracted logistics solution, which also allows any adjustments 
to be made during the course of the contract. There is no way to identify a perfect metric, 
but for each case, managers should seek to identify the most appropriate set of such 
elements in order to encourage the improvement of the contractor's performance, while at 
the same time meeting the requirements of the warfighter, which will result in a unique 
service, of reduced cost and higher quality (U.S. Department of Defense, 2016). 
In order to implement a PBL contract with consistent metrics, all parameters 
considered in the contract should be analyzed in an integrated way. Some decisions can 
influence the metrics discussed before in opposite directions, as example, a higher level 
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of inventory will result in higher availability as discussed before, but means higher cost 
of supportability (Lopes et al., 2017). 
Designing a performance-based contract, however, may be a daunting task for 
managers tempted to control every component of the logistics chain, willing to add more 
and more metrics in the agreement. Doerr et al. (2004) perfectly illustrate this dilemma 
on their research, as follows: 
(…) if we are engaged in an initiative to buy performance, (…) wouldn’t it 
make more sense to measure only key outcomes, and measure them well? 
When we first presented this idea at a conference, we were met with the 
objection that an abundance of measures do not necessarily distract a decision 
maker from key tasks. The analogy was drawn to a pilot in a jet, where the 
cockpit has a superabundance of meters and instruments, almost all of which 
can be ignored, except in the case of an emergency. The analogy is a telling 
one, in that most of the people making decisions about metrics for PBL have 
themselves been pilots, or ship captains, or in charge of some complex process 
in the past. However, PBL is not supposed to present the DoD with a complex 
process to manage – it is supposed to take one off the hands of the DoD. We 
aren’t supposed to be flying the plane – we are supposed to be passengers. 
When you are paying someone else to get you to your destination, you care 
about the price of the ticket, and arriving on time. 
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III. Methodology 
 
Simulation as a logistics tool 
Simulation approaches are ways to imitate the operation of real-world systems. 
By creating a model representing characteristics, behaviors and functions of the selected 
system or process, the simulation can represent the operation of the system over time. 
This technique is able to yield near optimal solutions when it finds the values of the 
system parameters that produce the desirable performance of the system. According to 
Rogers (2002), simulation-based optimization is a method by which an optimization 
engine offers the input components for the simulation program, which will go on and 
present the results for a previously specified objective function. Until results are shown 
for a satisfied solution or for termination due to prescribed conditions, the simulation 
process will continue iteratively between the simulation program and the optimization 
engine. 
This methodology has long been supported in logistics applications, first, as an 
instrument to recognize and calculate the enhanced operation performance, and, second, 
as a tool to gain a sharper knowledge of the potential cost and performance of logistics 
operations (Bowersox & Closs, 1989). Because many logistics processes are not easily 
analytically traceable, simulation brings an advantage over analytical methods such as 
better understanding of complex systems and experiments of various systems. 
In this context, computer simulation is growing in popularity as an approach for 
organizational researchers, which allows them to take the inherent complexity of 
organizational systems and to focus on “what-if” analysis, while other research methods 
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must make various assumptions about the exact cause and effect nature of the system 
under study. In fact, the key strength of simulation is its ability to support the 
investigation of phenomena that are difficult to study using conventional analytical 
methods. 
OPUS10 Software 
In order to provide a novel analysis and a different perspective to the evaluation 
of possible changes on PBC performance goals, a versatile simulation tool must be 
chosen, with adequate capabilities to provide an insightful analysis. These requirements 
are well fulfilled by OPUS10, a comprehensive computer program developed by the 
Swedish company Systecon, with its main focus in logistics support and spares 
optimization.   
According to Systecon (n.d.), OPUS 10 provides realistic modeling of technology 
and support solutions, rapid calculations, and results that significantly reduce the spare 
part investment while increasing system availability. It also provides indispensable 
decision support in a wide range of situations, like optimizing the entire maintenance 
concept or evaluating and comparing alternative support solutions. In addition, since it is 
scalable and flexible, it can handle smaller scenarios with a handful of components and a 
few locations to large programs with thousands of components and a complex support 
solution. The effective optimization algorithms make that even large cases can be 
optimized in seconds. 
Several academic studies have been successful in assessing this tool for a wide 
range of logistics systems applications, as can be seen in Wu & Hsu (2008), Wijk & 
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Andersson (2012), (Tysseland, 2009), Lindqvist & Lundin (2010), Karlsson (2015) and 
Bussche (2019), among others. 
OPUS10 assumes stationary conditions and that spare part demand at the 
operational bases can be approximated as a Poisson process. By default, the Vari-
METRIC (Multi-Indenture and Multi-Echelon Technique for Recoverable Item Control) 
method is used, with METRIC being optional. It should also be noted that while the 
formulas used by OPUS10 are based on these inventory theories, they have seen 
considerable advancements over the years, resulting in more accurate estimates 
(Karlsson, 2015). However, complete and adequate descriptions of all variables 
considered by the cited software are not part of the scope of this research and, therefore, 
will not be assessed. 
Data Used as Input  
This study mainly intends to evaluate the effects on life support costs due to the 
addition of metrics, or performance goals, in a PBL agreement. In this way, it would not 
be feasible to get real data for this kind of analysis, considering the inherent 
characteristics of an Air Force’s operations. Information regarding cost raises due to 
faster return requirements imposed to contractors would also be extremely difficult to 
measure accurately, and would require a thorough study beyond the objectives of this 
research. 
The scope of this investigation, in fact, comprehends the evaluation of different 
scenarios and values to determine a range of possible outcomes, given the limited data 
available. In this way, managers will be able to make the most informed decision when 
facing similar circumstances. For these reasons, the use of real data to evaluate the 
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logistical mechanisms involved in the simulations is not needed: the key here is to 
understand, in general, how sensitive are the life support costs to metric changes in a 
contract based on performance. 
Therefore, this examination will consider a scenario with only one type of 
operating aircraft, defined as BR-AIRCRAFT, in a time span of five years. The annual 
utilization factor is defined as 0.290, resulting in 2,540 flight hours per aircraft in one 
year. Only failures on components will be considered (not in the system), and each 
system will have the item structure given shown in Figure 4, meaning that one aircraft is 
composed by 2 engines, 1 APU, 2 pumps, and so on. Another common feature for all 
models to be tested is showed on Figure 5, which provides unit prices and failure rates for 
each component. The failure rate (FRT) is given as the number of expected failures over 
a million of operating hours: thus, the engine FRT is defined as 0.00011 failures per 
operating hour (110 failures divided by 1,000,000 hours), for example. 
 
 
Figure 4. OPUS10 Input Table: Materiel/ItemStructure – Quantities of items per system 
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Figure 5. OPUS10 Input Table: Materiel/Item – Unit prices and failure rates per item 
 
Scenarios to be simulated  
One of the objectives of this research is to verify if PBC metrics changes will 
eventually be more impactful in costs for specific logistical configurations. Consequently, 
five different logistics scenarios will be proposed for simulation, according to Table 3. 
Each scenario will have a different combination of the number of operational bases (sites 
where aircrafts operate), depots (locations where failed items are sent from the 
operational bases, and where repaired components are shipped after maintenance) and 
workshops (repair centers) available. 
For scenarios with more than one depot or workshop, specific groups of 
components were defined, to enable the particular flows of items through the distribution 
and repair sites, as identified in Table 4. 
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Table 3: Logistics scenarios to be tested in OPUS10 
Scenario name 
Scenario 
acronym 
Number of 
Workshops 
Number of 
Depots 
Number of 
Bases 
Details 
Basic  
Logistics Scenario 
BLS 1 1 2 
12 aircrafts operating on “Near Base”,  
6 aircrafts operating on “Far Base” 
Alternative Logistics 
Scenario 01 
ALS1 1 1 3 
6 aircrafts operating on “Near Base”,  
6 aircrafts operating on “Far Base”,  
6 aircrafts operating on “Even Far Base” 
Alternative Logistics 
Scenario 02 
ALS2 1 2 2 
Similar as BLS, but with  
Group 1 items going to Near Depot,  
Group 2 items going to Far Depot 
Alternative Logistics 
Scenario 03 
ALS3 2 1 2 
Similar as BLS, but with  
Group 3 items repaired in Near Workshop,  
Group 4 items repaired in Far Workshop 
Alternative Logistics 
Scenario 04 
ALS4 2 2 3 
Similar as ALS1, but with  
Group 1 items going to Near Depot,  
Group 2 items going to Far Depot, 
Group 3 items repaired in Near Workshop,  
Group 4 items repaired in Far Workshop 
 
Table 4: Specific groups for each component, when required 
Item Depot Group Workshop Group 
ENGINE 
Group 1 
Group 3 
APU Group 4 
CSD Group 3 
PUMP Group 4 
FCU Group 3 
STAB CTRL 
Group 2 
Group 4 
GYRO VERT Group 3 
DOOR MLG Group 4 
PITCH COMP Group 3 
FLAP ACT Group 4 
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Basic Logistics Scenario (BLS) 
An illustration of a possible logistics configuration for the first scenario is shown 
in Figure 6, containing the transportation times to move items between each site. Figure 7 
shows the resultant input model in OPUS10.  
 
  
Figure 6. Positioning and transportation times for the first scenario (BLS) 
 
  
Figure 7. OPUS10 station structure for the first scenario (BLS) - both transportation times 
between stations (to send and return components) are considered the same 
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Alternative Logistics Scenario 01 (ALS1) 
Likewise, the second scenario can have its possible logistics configuration 
represented as shown in Figure 8, covering the transportation times to transfer items 
between each location. The resulting OPUS10 input model is given by Figure 9. 
 
  
Figure 8. Positioning and transportation times for the second scenario (ALS1) 
 
  
Figure 9. OPUS10 station structure for the second scenario (ALS1) - both transportation 
times between stations (to send and return components) are considered the same 
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Alternative Logistics Scenario 02 (ALS2) 
An example of a feasible logistics configuration for the third setup is 
demonstrated in Figure 10, including the transportation times to relocate items between 
each station. Figure 11 presents the resulting input model in OPUS10. 
 
  
Figure 10. Positioning and transportation times for the third scenario (ALS2) 
 
  
Figure 11. OPUS10 station structure for the third scenario (ALS2) - both transportation 
times between stations (to send and return components) are considered the same 
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Alternative Logistics Scenario 03 (ALS3) 
Similarly, the fourth situation can have its potential logistics configuration 
characterized as displayed in Figure 12, comprising the transportation times to move 
items among each site. The resulting OPUS10 input model is provided by Figure 13. 
 
  
Figure 12. Positioning and transportation times for the fourth scenario (ALS3) 
 
  
Figure 13. OPUS10 station structure for the fourth scenario (ALS3) - both transportation 
times between stations (to send and return components) are considered the same 
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Alternative Logistics Scenario 04 (ALS4) 
At last, a representation of a possible logistics configuration for the fifth scenario 
is exhibited in Figure 14, containing the transportation times to relocate items amongst 
each station. Figure 15 shows the subsequent input model in OPUS10. 
 
  
Figure 14. Positioning and transportation times for the fifth scenario (ALS4) 
 
  
Figure 15. OPUS10 station structure for the fifth scenario (ALS4) - both transportation 
times between stations (to send and return components) are considered the same 
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Changes on Repair Times and Costs induced by PBC Metrics in Each Scenario 
Having defined all possible logistical designs, the potential changes that could be 
introduced in those scenarios due to performance requirements will now be introduced. 
In this study, initially a logistics configuration operating with optimal 
performance is being considered, with an availability level of 80% for the fleet. In other 
words, before any specific intermediate requirement to be set by a future contract, the 
logistics system is operating in the best possible way and providing the desired output of 
80% availability. In such condition, the simulation will assume the following values of 
turnaround time (TAT) and Repair Costs (RC), showed in Table 5. The initial value for 
the latter was defined as 25% of the unit price, for all items. 
Table 5: Turnaround Times and Repair Costs in the initial condition and at 80% availability level   
Item 
Direct Repair TAT* 
(hours) 
Direct RC  
($) 
ENGINE 2000 10000 
APU 1000 1500 
CSD 2000 2500 
PUMP 1000 100 
FCU 2000 1000 
STAB CTRL 1000 2000 
GYRO VERT 2000 200 
DOOR MLG 1000 300 
PITCH COMP 2000 400 
FLAP ACT 1000 600 
*The Repair TAT here is not considering transportation times between stations,  
only the time spent in the workshop to repair, for simplification purposes. 
 
Starting from this point, high-level fleet managers make the decision to apply a 
PBC sustainment strategy to support that fleet. However, in an attempt to tie the 
contractor to some performance goals that could help them to achieve the desired 
supporting objectives, an intermediary metric is established in regard to the maximum 
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turnaround time allowed to the contractor to return a component after receiving it for 
repair.  
As can be observed in Table 5, the initial condition of the simulation (which is 
considered to provide optimal performance regarding availability) shows different TAT 
values for each component. In an actual support organization, anyone would intuitively 
expect these values to be even sparser, with each item having its own intrinsic TAT to 
obtain an optimal output in a logistics configuration, since they all have different repair 
prices, stock sizes, among others. 
Therefore, when a metric such as maximum allowable TAT is imposed on a 
performance-based contract, a certain degree of adjustment in several logistical 
parameters will definitely be needed to accommodate this change. In this research, it will 
be analyzed the impact on only one factor certainly affected by the need to reduce TAT: 
the repair cost. If shorter times are required, a higher cost will be charged to meet this 
demand. 
In this study, the imposition of faster TAT will be simulated by applying the same 
percentage drop to all original times defined in the initial condition of the support 
structure. Thus, simulations will run contemplating reductions of 20% and 40% in 
turnaround times, modeling the effect of the imposition of a TAT metric on a logistics 
system that was operating in its optimal performance condition. For each of these TAT 
decreases, three different possible consequences on repair costs will be checked: 
increases of 5%, 10% and 15% in maintenance expenses. 
Table 6 displays all the values that will be used as inputs, given the proposed 
changes discussed above. 
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Table 6: Values to be tested due to TAT reductions and RC increases    
 
 
Model Assumptions and Limitations 
The model proposed for this simulation is assuming an initial condition where the 
support organization is operating with optimal performance for a desired fleet availability 
level. In the real world, a logistics system is unlikely to operate optimally, given the 
extremely dynamic environment in which an aircraft fleet is inserted. 
Only failures in components are being modeled, not in the aircraft itself, and the 
only possibility of repairing a failed item is by sending it to a workshop, so there is no 
possible repair on the bases or depots. Consequently, preventive or predictive 
maintenance are not being taken into account in this study. 
The only station authorized to stock components is the depot, thus nothing can be 
stored on any base. Also, items can only go up to the mother station - from base to depot, 
and from depot to workshop - and vice-versa. Therefore, there is no lateral support, nor 
Item
Direct 
Repair 
TAT
Direct 
Repair 
Cost
20% lower 
Repair TAT
40% lower 
Repair TAT
5% higher 
Repair Cost
10% higher 
Repair Cost
15% higher 
Repair Cost
ENGINE 2000 10000 1600 1200 10500 11000 11500
APU 1000 1500 800 600 1575 1650 1725
CSD 2000 2500 1600 1200 2625 2750 2875
PUMP 1000 100 800 600 105 110 115
FCU 2000 1000 1600 1200 1050 1100 1150
STAB CTRL 1000 2000 800 600 2100 2200 2300
GYRO VERT 2000 200 1600 1200 210 220 230
DOOR MLG 1000 300 800 600 315 330 345
PITCH COMP 2000 400 1600 1200 420 440 460
FLAP ACT 1000 600 800 600 630 660 690
Initial Condition
TAT reductions 
to be simulated
Possibilities of increase in 
Repair Cost for each TAT reduction
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cannibalization. Transportation times are considered the same for sending and returning 
items between stations.  
The only expenditure sources are the repair costs, to fix an item in a workshop 
after its failure, and the acquisition costs to purchase the necessary quantity of 
components to be allocated in each logistical configuration, which will guarantee the 
system's capacity to reach the desired availability levels. Thus, several other costs are not 
included in this analysis, such as storage costs, man-hours costs, transportation costs, 
depreciation costs, among others.  
Furthermore, only specific levels of changes in TAT and RC are being modeled. 
Any other effect in the logistical configuration due to a TAT reduction is not taken into 
account, only the possible impact on repair costs. For example, if the system experiences 
faster turnaround times, fewer items will be stored in the depot and storage costs may be 
reduced. Also, transportation times between stations are not being included in these TAT 
changes, for simplification purposes. As they are much lower than the time spent 
repairing items in the workshop, we consider that this assumption will not affect the 
analysis.  
Experiments Simulated  
In the previous paragraphs, the five logistical configurations to be simulated were 
defined, as well as the changes in TAT and repair costs to be implemented in each of 
them, starting from an initial condition with optimal performance. However, it is also 
important to clarify more specifically how these changes will be gradually introduced 
into the simulation model.  
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For each logistics scenario, first all input data previously stated will be inserted, 
and the main output generated by running the model using OPUS10 will be a 
cost/effectiveness (C/E) chart like the one illustrated in Figure 16, showing all the 
optimal availability levels for each amount of resources – the life support costs (LSC) - to 
be invested in supporting the fleet’s life cycle. However, from the theory of inventory 
management, it is known that such graph is not a continuous curve, but a boundary 
created by the connection of several discrete points, each of them corresponding to a 
unique quantity of stock allocation among the components existing in the support 
organization. 
 
  
Figure 16. Cost/Effectiveness (C/E) curve given as output by OPUS10 (Systecon, n.d.) 
 
The first output generated for each scenario will show the optimal 
cost/availability points for a system with the entries presented in Table 3. But the focus is 
on the point where availability reaches the target level of 80%. As discussed, that is not a 
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continuous curve, so the point closest to the availability objective will be chosen, and, for 
this selection, there will be an unequivocal stock allocation associated with it. 
This assortment of items will be the starting point for the next simulation run. The 
problem type will be changed from INITIAL (a short for Initial Procurement) to 
ANALYSIS in the OPUS10 input table Program Control/ControlParameters, as shown 
to Figure 17. In addition, the possibilities of TAT reductions and increases in repair costs 
will be included in the model. In this way, running the model will now provide 
information about LSC and the availability inherent in that specific configuration. This 
will be a point solution, and not a curve as in the first step. And considering the proposed 
simulation parameters, it is possible to postulate that a higher availability could be 
achieved, since the turnaround times will decrease, but also the life support costs will 
grow, given the increases in repair costs. 
  
Figure 17. Change of problem type to ANALYSIS in OPUS10 to evaluate life support 
costs and availability for a given assortment of items 
 
Nevertheless, there is still a need to evaluate if the point obtained in the previous 
step is in the optimal availability/costs boundary for that mixture of TAT/RC, and which 
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would be the optimal LSC value and stock allocation associated with this combination for 
an availability level of 80%. So, in this second step, the problem type will again be set as 
INITIAL, and the output will be the optimal frontier curve of availability versus LSC.  
And then, running the simulation and obtaining this latest boundary, it will be 
possible to find the new optimal stock allocation for 80% availability. Compared with the 
previous step, the latter assortment of items will be reduced in quantities, making it 
possible to decrease LSC, although some efficiency is also lost. 
As there are three different possibilities for changes in RC for each of the two 
TAT reductions to be tested, a total of six combinations will be verified with these exam 
levels. Since each of these combinations requires two steps/simulations runs to be 
assessed, and counting with the first simulation run for the initial logistical condition, a 
total of thirteen simulation runs will be needed to evaluate each logistics scenario, as 
listed in Table 7. 
Table 7: List of thirteen simulation runs to evaluate each logistics scenario    
  
  
# 
Configuration
For Each Scenario:
Sub-Scenario 
Acronym 
1 Optimal Stock Allocation (OSA) for 80% Availability OSA%80
2 OSA with 20% lower repair TAT, 5% higher repair costs 20T05C+80
3 New Optimal Stock Allocation with 20T05C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability 20T05C%80
4 OSA with 20% lower repair TAT, 10% higher repair costs 20T10C+80
5 New Optimal Stock Allocation with 20T10C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability 20T10C%80
6 OSA with 20% lower repair TAT, 15% higher repair costs 20T15C+80
7 New Optimal Stock Allocation with 20T15C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability 20T15C%80
8 OSA with 40% lower repair TAT, 5% higher repair costs 40T05C+80
9 New Optimal Stock Allocation with 40T05C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability 40T05C%80
10 OSA with 40% lower repair TAT, 10% higher repair costs 40T10C+80
11 New Optimal Stock Allocation with 40T10C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability 40T10C%80
12 OSA with 40% lower repair TAT, 15% higher repair costs 40T15C+80
13 New Optimal Stock Allocation with 40T15C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability 40T15C%80
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
Comparative Results within Each Scenario 
Using the guidelines presented before, all OPUS10 simulation runs were done for 
each of the logistics configurations, and the results are summarized from Tables 8 to 12. 
It is imperative to mention that, according to the methodology previously proposed, every 
row in these tables corresponding to Simulation Identifiers ending in odd numbers should 
present information regarding an availability level of 80%. However, since the 
Cost/Effectiveness curve given by OPUS10 is not a continuous line, the closest point to 
the availability objective was chosen, as discussed earlier. 
Table 8: Numerical results obtained in BLS for each simulation run in OPUS10    
 
Table 9: Numerical results obtained in ALS1 for each simulation run in OPUS10    
 
Table 10: Numerical results obtained in ALS2 for each simulation run in OPUS10    
 
Scenario Name Scenario/Sub-Scenario Acronym Simulation Identifier %Δ Repair Costs %Δ TAT LSC ($) %Δ LSC Availability %Δ Avail.
BLS-1:OSA%80 A1 0% 0% 1598282.00 0.00% 79.98% 0.00%
BLS-2:20T05C+80 A2 5% -20% 1668415.92 4.39% 84.64% 4.66%
BLS-3:20T05C%80 A3 5% -20% 1619615.92 1.33% 79.91% -0.07%
BLS-4:20T10C+80 A4 10% -20% 1738550.02 8.78% 84.64% 4.66%
BLS-5:20T10C%80 A5 10% -20% 1689750.02 5.72% 79.91% -0.07%
BLS-6:20T15C+80 A6 15% -20% 1808684.11 13.16% 84.64% 4.66%
BLS-7:20T15C%80 A7 15% -20% 1759884.11 10.11% 79.91% -0.07%
BLS-8:40T05C+80 A8 5% -40% 1668415.92 4.39% 88.07% 8.09%
BLS-9:40T05C%80 A9 5% -40% 1580815.92 -1.09% 80.88% 0.90%
BLS-10:40T10C+80 A10 10% -40% 1738550.02 8.78% 88.07% 8.09%
BLS-11:40T10C%80 A11 10% -40% 1650950.02 3.30% 80.88% 0.90%
BLS-12:40T15C+80 A12 15% -40% 1808684.11 13.16% 88.07% 8.09%
BLS-13:40T15C%80 A13 15% -40% 1721084.11 7.68% 80.88% 0.90%
Basic Logistics Scenario 
(BLS)
Scenario Name Scenario/Sub-Scenario Acronym Simulation Identifier %Δ Repair Costs %Δ TAT LSC ($) %Δ LSC Availability %Δ Avail.
ALS1-1:OSA%80 B1 0% 0% 1610681.85 0.00% 79.62% 0.00%
ALS1-2:20T05C+80 B2 5% -20% 1680815.94 4.35% 83.63% 4.01%
ALS1-3:20T05C%80 B3 5% -20% 1629615.94 1.18% 79.63% 0.01%
ALS1-4:20T10C+80 B4 10% -20% 1750950.03 8.71% 83.63% 4.01%
ALS1-5:20T10C%80 B5 10% -20% 1699750.03 5.53% 79.63% 0.01%
ALS1-6:20T15C+80 B6 15% -20% 1821084.12 13.06% 83.63% 4.01%
ALS1-7:20T15C%80 B7 15% -20% 1769884.12 9.88% 79.63% 0.01%
ALS1-8:40T05C+80 B8 5% -40% 1680815.94 4.35% 86.61% 6.99%
ALS1-9:40T05C%80 B9 5% -40% 1582415.94 -1.75% 79.49% -0.13%
ALS1-10:40T10C+80 B10 10% -40% 1750950.03 8.71% 86.61% 6.99%
ALS1-11:40T10C%80 B11 10% -40% 1652550.03 2.60% 79.49% -0.13%
ALS1-12:40T15C+80 B12 15% -40% 1821084.12 13.06% 86.61% 6.99%
ALS1-13:40T15C%80 B13 15% -40% 1722684.12 6.95% 79.49% -0.13%
Alternative Logistics 
Scenario 01 (ALS1)
Scenario Name Scenario/Sub-Scenario Acronym Simulation Identifier %Δ Repair Costs %Δ TAT LSC ($) %Δ LSC Availability %Δ Avail.
ALS2-1:OSA%80 C1 0% 0% 1614282.00 0.00% 79.00% 0.00%
ALS2-2:20T05C+80 C2 5% -20% 1680815.92 4.12% 82.68% 3.68%
ALS2-3:20T05C%80 C3 5% -20% 1637615.92 1.45% 79.58% 0.58%
ALS2-4:20T10C+80 C4 10% -20% 1754950.02 8.71% 82.83% 3.83%
ALS2-5:20T10C%80 C5 10% -20% 1707750.02 5.79% 79.58% 0.58%
ALS2-6:20T15C+80 C6 15% -20% 1825084.11 13.06% 82.83% 3.83%
ALS2-7:20T15C%80 C7 15% -20% 1777884.11 10.13% 79.58% 0.58%
ALS2-8:40T05C+80 C8 5% -40% 1684815.92 4.37% 85.69% 6.69%
ALS2-9:40T05C%80 C9 5% -40% 1590415.92 -1.48% 79.86% 0.86%
ALS2-10:40T10C+80 C10 10% -40% 1754950.02 8.71% 85.69% 6.69%
ALS2-11:40T10C%80 C11 10% -40% 1660550.02 2.87% 79.86% 0.86%
ALS2-12:40T15C+80 C12 15% -40% 1825084.11 13.06% 85.69% 6.69%
ALS2-13:40T15C%80 C13 15% -40% 1734284.11 7.43% 79.25% 0.25%
Alternative Logistics 
Scenario 02 (ALS2)
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Table 11: Numerical results obtained in ALS3 for each simulation run in OPUS10    
 
Table 12: Numerical results obtained in ALS4 for each simulation run in OPUS10    
 
  
 All the five logistics scenarios should be analyzed starting from the initial setup 
(Simulation Identifiers equal to 1) and, for every interrelated change that occur in 
TAT/RC, a pair of simulation runs were done. Thus, for example, when analyzing the 
effect in the Basic Logistics Scenario (BLS) of a 20% reduction in TAT, considering a 
5% increase in RC, the evaluation starts from simulation A1, and the required first step is 
to run simulation A2, resulting in both higher availability and life support costs, using the 
same stock allocation as in A1. The second step is to go from A2 to A3 simulation, where 
a new optimal combination of availability and costs is achieved, reducing the quantities 
in the assortment of items.  
In the following figures, showing OPUS10 outputs for all scenarios and parameter 
changes, it will be possible to graphically visualize the effects of the changes induced by 
the first and second steps, always starting from the initial setup. 
 
Scenario Name Scenario/Sub-Scenario Acronym Simulation Identifier %Δ Repair Costs %Δ TAT LSC ($) %Δ LSC Availability %Δ Avail.
ALS3-1:OSA%80 D1 0% 0% 1599481.83 0.00% 79.83% 0.00%
ALS3-2:20T05C+80 D2 5% -20% 1669615.92 3.66% 84.52% 4.69%
ALS3-3:20T05C%80 D3 5% -20% 1619615.92 0.55% 79.56% -0.27%
ALS3-4:20T10C+80 D4 10% -20% 1739750.02 8.01% 84.52% 4.69%
ALS3-5:20T10C%80 D5 10% -20% 1689750.02 4.91% 79.56% -0.27%
ALS3-6:20T15C+80 D6 15% -20% 1809884.11 12.37% 84.52% 4.69%
ALS3-7:20T15C%80 D7 15% -20% 1759884.11 9.26% 79.56% -0.27%
ALS3-8:40T05C+80 D8 5% -40% 1669615.92 3.66% 87.99% 8.16%
ALS3-9:40T05C%80 D9 5% -40% 1580815.92 -1.85% 80.36% 0.53%
ALS3-10:40T10C+80 D10 10% -40% 1739750.02 8.01% 87.99% 8.16%
ALS3-11:40T10C%80 D11 10% -40% 1650950.02 2.50% 80.36% 0.53%
ALS3-12:40T15C+80 D12 15% -40% 1809884.11 12.37% 87.99% 8.16%
ALS3-13:40T15C%80 D13 15% -40% 1721084.11 6.85% 80.36% 0.53%
Alternative Logistics 
Scenario 03 (ALS3)
Scenario Name Scenario/Sub-Scenario Acronym Simulation Identifier %Δ Repair Costs %Δ TAT LSC ($) %Δ LSC Availability %Δ Avail.
ALS4-1:OSA%80 E1 0% 0% 1662681.85 0.00% 81.16% 0.00%
ALS4-2:20T05C+80 E2 5% -20% 1732815.94 4.22% 84.87% 3.71%
ALS4-3:20T05C%80 E3 5% -20% 1661615.94 -0.06% 79.99% -1.17%
ALS4-4:20T10C+80 E4 10% -20% 1802950.03 8.44% 84.87% 3.71%
ALS4-5:20T10C%80 E5 10% -20% 1731750.03 4.15% 79.99% -1.17%
ALS4-6:20T15C+80 E6 15% -20% 1873084.12 12.65% 84.87% 3.71%
ALS4-7:20T15C%80 E7 15% -20% 1801884.12 8.37% 79.99% -1.17%
ALS4-8:40T05C+80 E8 5% -40% 1732815.94 4.22% 87.43% 6.27%
ALS4-9:40T05C%80 E9 5% -40% 1611615.94 -3.07% 80.47% -0.69%
ALS4-10:40T10C+80 E10 10% -40% 1802950.03 8.44% 87.43% 6.27%
ALS4-11:40T10C%80 E11 10% -40% 1681750.03 1.15% 80.47% -0.69%
ALS4-12:40T15C+80 E12 15% -40% 1873084.12 12.65% 87.43% 6.27%
ALS4-13:40T15C%80 E13 15% -40% 1751884.12 5.36% 80.47% -0.69%
Alternative Logistics 
Scenario 04 (ALS4)
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BLS Results 
Figure 18 shows the output curves and points generated by OPUS10 after running 
simulations for 20% TAT reductions for all three possible increases in repair costs, 
comparing them with the initial setup. In Figure 19 a detailed view of the changes is 
shown, keeping only the optimal points closest to the targeted availability level of 80%. 
  
Figure 18. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 20% TAT reduction in BLS 
  
Figure 19. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in BLS  
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In the same way, Figure 20 shows the output curves and points generated by 
OPUS10 after running simulations for 40% TAT cuts for all three possible rises in RC, 
comparing them with the initial setup. Figure 21 shows a detailed view of the changes, 
retaining only the optimal points closest to the targeted availability level of 80%. 
  
Figure 20. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 40% TAT reduction in BLS 
  
Figure 21. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 40% TAT reduction in BLS 
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ALS1 Results 
The output curves and points produced by OPUS10 after running simulations for 
20% TAT drops for all three possible increases in RC in shown in Figure 22, comparing 
them with the initial situation. A detailed view of the changes is presented in Figure 23, 
maintaining only the optimal points closest to the 80% availability level. 
  
Figure 22. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS1 
  
Figure 23. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS1 
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Similarly, Figure 24 shows the output curves and points generated by OPUS10 
after running simulations for 40% TAT reductions for all three possible escalations in 
repair costs, comparing them with the initial setup. Figure 25 shows a detailed view of 
the changes, preserving only the optimal points closest to the availability goal of 80%. 
  
Figure 24. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS1 
  
Figure 25. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS1  
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ALS2 Results 
OPUS10 output curves and points are given by Figure 26, after running 
simulations for 20% TAT reductions for all three possible increases in RC, comparing 
them with the initial setup. In Figure 27 a detailed view of the changes is shown, keeping 
only the optimal points nearest to the pursued availability level of 80%. 
 
Figure 26. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS2 
  
Figure 27. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS2 
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Likewise, Figure 28 illustrates the output curves and points made by OPUS10 
when running simulations for 40% TAT reductions for all three possible increases in 
repair costs, contrasting them with the original setup. A detailed view of the changes is 
exhibited in Figure 29, retaining just the optimal points closest to the targeted availability 
of 80%. 
 
Figure 28. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS2 
  
Figure 29. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS2 
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ALS3 Results 
The output given by OPUS10 after running simulations for 20% TAT decreases 
for all three potential increases in repair costs is displayed in Figure 30, comparing them 
with the initial system. Figure 31 presents a detailed view of the changes, keeping just the 
optimal points adjacent to the 80% availability mark. 
  
Figure 30. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS3 
  
Figure 31. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS3 
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Subsequently, Figure 32 reveals the output curves and points produced by 
OPUS10 after running simulations for 40% TAT decreases for all three possible raises in 
RC, contrasting them with the initial arrangement. Figure 33 illustrates a detailed picture 
of the modifications, staying only the optimal points closest to the pursued availability 
level of 80%. 
  
Figure 32. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS3 
  
Figure 33. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 4% TAT reduction in ALS3  
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ALS4 Results 
Figure 34 indicates the outputs offered by OPUS10 following simulation runs for 
20% TAT decreases for all three possible increases in repair costs, comparing them with 
the opening setup. In Figure 35 a detailed picture of the changes is displayed, keeping 
only the optimal points closest to the availability target of 80%. 
  
Figure 34. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS4 
  
Figure 35. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS4 
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Also, Figure 36 illustrates the output curves and points generated by OPUS10 
after doing simulations for 40% TAT reductions for all three potential increases in repair 
costs, comparing them with the initial procedure. Figure 37 shows a precise view of the 
variations, maintaining only the optimal points nearest to the targeted availability level of 
80%. 
  
Figure 36. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS4 
  
Figure 37. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS4 
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Analysis of the Results within Each Scenario 
From the simulation outputs presented, it can be noticed that, in most cases, the 
LSC will be higher when a TAT reduction is enforced in the logistics system. However, 
when a TAT reduction of 40% is followed by an increase of only 5% in RC, life support 
costs may even be less than in the original logistics setup.  
A better view of the effects on LSC of the different tested combinations of TAT 
and RC changes is provided in Figures 38 to 42. Ideally, these charts should contain only 
information regarding logistical configurations corresponding to exactly the same 
availability, which would be the 80% target. But this is nearly impossible in practical 
terms, since the optimal cost-effectiveness curve is not continuous, but a discrete 
sequence of points.  
For this reason, the curves shown in the following figures are only reasonable 
approximations to allow comparison, because the hypothetical accurate curves should 
represent the values for exactly the same availability as the original setup. The arrows in 
the charts point to the directions where the curves should be slightly moved to reflect the 
same availability as the initial test configuration.  
Taking Figure 38 as an example, the curve for a 20% TAT reduction should be 
moved smoothly upwards, since it represents an availability 0.07% lower than the 
original setup; therefore, to achieve the same level of availability, the cost would be a 
little percentage higher. In the same figure, the curve for a 40% TAT reduction should be 
gently moved in the opposite direction, as it is given for an availability 0.90% higher than 
the initial configuration; hence, to accomplish equivalent availability the cost would be a 
bit lower. The same reasoning can be applied to Figures 39 to 42. 
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Figure 38. BLS: Effect on LSC of different mixes of TAT and RC changes 
  
Figure 39. ALS1: Effect on LSC of different mixes of TAT and RC changes 
  
Figure 40. ALS2: Effect on LSC of different mixes of TAT and RC changes 
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Figure 41. ALS3: Effect on LSC of different mixes of TAT and RC changes 
  
Figure 42. ALS4: Effect on LSC of different mixes of TAT and RC changes 
 
Another remarkable mechanism to be discussed involves the dynamics between 
the first and second steps, as detailed in Figures 19 to 37. In an actual logistics system, it 
is not so easy to naturally navigate among these configuration changes. If all items are 
obliged to move faster in the logistics chain by reducing TAT requirements, intuitively 
there will be a positive effect on availability.  
However, this additional effort will certainly be accompanied by cost increases, as 
discussed earlier. And considering only the parameters debated in this study, the only 
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way to compensate this addition in the LSC would be to reduce the existing stock of 
components available to support the fleet, otherwise they would represent an additional 
cost now unnecessary, since that extra availability is not necessary: the operational 
requirement is 80%, anything beyond that is just a superfluous cost.  
Thus, to return to an optimal mix of LSC and availability, managers would need 
to discard excess items, recovering the same amount invested in the acquisition of these 
components. Despite this being an unrealistic assumption, it was taken as true for in this 
study. Therefore, in a real system, it would be necessary to take into account the 
depreciation costs on the items already put in service and now no longer needed, and that 
would eventually be sold to some other user, or returned to the manufacturer by 
recovering a portion of the amount invested in its acquisition, for example.  
Again, in the real world this recapitalization process is quite complex, and even 
unusual. Therefore, the chances are that costs would only increase considerably, virtually 
acquiring a greater capacity to achieve higher availability rates, even though this resource 
is being committed to a completely unnecessary capacity. 
Comparative Results among Different Scenarios  
To allow a comparison amongst all the tested logistics scenarios, OPUS10 was 
used to build the chart in Figure 43, where it is possible to verify that ALS4 has the 
highest intrinsic life support costs, followed by ALS2, ALS1, ALS3 and finally by BLS, 
which is the most economical configuration.  
On Table 13, a rough evaluation between the configurations corresponding to the 
availability level closest to 80% is shown, where the same order of costs described above 
can be verified. It can be seen that BLS and ALS3 have very close results, while ALS1 
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and AL2 would be at a slightly higher level (with costs around 1% higher), and finally 
ALS4 would result in costs significantly higher, around 4% more than the most 
economical configuration. Again, it is necessary to remember that an exact comparison is 
not possible, given the discrete characteristic of the output C/E curve. An interpolation 
could be done to find approximate LSC values for exactly 80% availability, but the 
analysis would be no different. 
  
Figure 43. Comparison between C/E curves for initial setups, in each logistics scenario 
Table 13: Comparison among initial setup values with availability closer to 80%, in each scenario  
 
C/E-Curve Diagram
1400000 1500000 1600000 1700000 1800000
Life Support Cost
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Availability
D1. ALS3-OSA%80
C1. ALS2-OSA%80
B1. ALS1-OSA%80
A1. BLS-OSA%80
E1. ALS4-OSA%80
Scenario
Scenario/Sub-
Scenario Acronym
Simulation 
Identifier
LSC ($) %Δ LSC Availability %Δ Avail.
BLS BLS-1:OSA%80 A1 1598282.00 0.00% 79.98% 0.00%
ALS1 ALS1-1:OSA%80 B1 1610681.85 0.78% 79.62% -0.36%
ALS2 ALS2-1:OSA%80 C1 1614282.00 1.00% 79.00% -0.98%
ALS3 ALS3-1:OSA%80 D1 1599481.83 0.08% 79.83% -0.15%
ALS4 ALS4-1:OSA%80 E1 1662681.85 4.03% 81.16% 1.18%
C/E-Curve Diagram 
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Another aspect to be observed here is how each of the tested logistical 
configurations responds to the proposed changes in TAT and repair costs. Figure 44 and 
Figure 45 are presenting the effect on LSC of the tested percentage increases in RC, for 
TAT reductions of 20% and 40%, respectively. 
In these illustrations, it can be clearly seen that the positive effect of reducing 
TAT, compared to the negative consequences of increases in repair costs, is greater for 
the ALS4 scenario than for the others. For a 20% TAT reduction, the ALS3 scenario also 
presents a noticeable better response compared to the latter scenarios, but going to a 40% 
TAT reduction this scenario provides results similar to ALS1, although still slightly 
better than ALS2 and BLS configurations. 
Therefore, there is evidence that a support organization containing more 
workshops (as is the case of ALS3 and ALS4) would be more positively affected by TAT 
reductions than the others, experiencing proportionally lower raises in the LSC. In 
addition, there is an indication that more complex logistical configuration would respond 
better to the proposed changes, given the noticeable differences between BLS and ALS4 
results, for example.  
Once again it is needed to remember that these charts should comprise only data 
concerning logistical configurations relating to exactly the same value of 80% 
availability. As debated before, this is virtually impossible in practical terms, and, due to 
this reason, the curves shown in the following figures are only rough approximations to 
allow comparison, since the hypothetical precise curves should display the values for 
exactly the same availability than in the initial configuration. The arrows next to each 
scenario identifier in the legend of Figure 44 and Figure 45 are indicating the directions 
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to which the curves should be slightly translated to reflect the same availability as the 
initial test configuration, according to the data provided in Tables 8 to 12. 
 
    
Figure 44. Comparison between tested logistics scenarios, given a 20% TAT reduction 
  
Figure 45. Comparison between tested logistics scenarios, given a 40% TAT reduction 
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Analysis of Research/Investigative Questions  
After thoroughly discussing the simulation results, the research and investigative 
questions proposed earlier in this study can be reviewed and discussed properly. 
RQ: How sensitive are the Life Support Costs to the addition of metrics in a 
Performance Based Contract? 
For the conditions tested, it was possible to conclude that life support costs were 
strongly sensitive to the addition of a metric that imposed a shorter turnaround time 
(TAT) for the components to return from repair in any workshop, which was detailed in 
the numerical results given by Tables 8 to 12. Although the magnitude is unique for every 
particular scenario, the trends in percentage changes in LSC are similar among them, 
with subtle differences in the slopes of the curves shown in Figures 38 to 42. 
IQ1: How does imposing a metric on the maximum turn-around time to repair 
a component affect LSC? 
This research was able to show how the enforcement of a metric on the maximum 
TAT to repair a component affected LSC, which in most cases became higher when a 
lower TAT was applied. Since this obligation will certainly result in higher costs for the 
contractor responsible for maintaining and transporting such components, these extra 
expenses will be charged to the final costumer.  
However, it was also possible to identify some simulations in which a lower LSC 
was achieved, all of them when repair costs were increased by the lower amount of 5%. 
This occurred for both the 20% and 40% TAT reductions tested in the ALS4 scenario, 
and also in all other tested scenarios, when the 40% TAT reduction was accompanied by 
only a 5% increase in RC.  
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In a real logistics system, though, the reductions in turnaround times simulated in 
this study would hardly correspond to such a small growth in repair costs. Therefore, 
scenarios in which a reduction in LSC occurs by imposing a reduction in TAT, although 
possible, are very unlikely. 
IQ2: Are these possible effects more sensitive in specific logistic 
configurations? 
Now reviewing the comparison among the different scenarios designed for this 
study, the simulation offered evidences to support the idea that more complex logistical 
configurations will present a better response to TAT reductions, getting lower percentage 
increases in LSC.  
But while ALS4, the most complex scenario, is also the one with highest absolute 
life support costs, the ALS3 configuration presented absolute LSC values very similar to 
the most basic scenario (BLS), as can be seen in Figure 43 (the BLS and ALS3 curves are 
practically the same). With this finding, it is possible to postulate that ALS3, the scenario 
with fewer operating bases and depots, and more workshops, would be the most 
recommended configuration for this logistics system, as it would have lower absolute life 
support costs and would respond better to changes in the TAT/RC mix. 
Expanding the Interpretation for Different Changes in Logistics Configuration  
The simulation experiment created for this research only took into account only 
one possible metric that could be affected by a performance-based contract design 
decision: the turnaround times (TAT). Nevertheless, there are several different processes 
making part of the logistics support chain that could be measured and whose desired 
minimum operating parameters could be established by a contract. 
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For instance, imagining a situation where fleet managers are designing a PBC to 
provide almost complete logistics support to an aircraft fleet (including component repair, 
supply of spare parts, obsolescence management, manpower to carry out major aircraft 
inspections, among others), they could feel that not only the amount of time an item 
should take to return after being sent for repair should be limited (as simulated in this 
study), but also that an aircraft should not take more than, for example, 100 days in 
maintenance. Worried with possible delays on the spare parts shipments, they also create 
an additional metric stating that the contractor must deliver every part in not more than, 
say, 50 days. Another possible concern could motivate a limitation on the maximum 
number of backorders allowed, assuring a certain fill rate level. Ultimately, many other 
parameters could be controlled in such a logistical support contract. 
Absolutely the same reasoning used in Chapter III (Methodology) could be 
applied again to assess these possible metrics impositions on the contractor. As discussed 
earlier, a certain degree of adjustment in various logistical factors would be needed to 
accommodate these possible parameter changes, but they would almost certainly end up 
impacting, to some degree, support costs. Nearly every improvement desired in a 
logistics support structure would be accompanied by an additional expense. And these 
extra costs would surely be charged to the end costumer.  
The case being made here is that all intermediate metrics enforced to the 
contractor will act as an additional constraint, with a potential negative effect on life 
support costs, unless the positive effects of adding such metrics to the logistics system 
outweigh the negative consequences of cost increases, as observed in some unlikely 
scenarios simulated in this study.  
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For this reason, the evidences here support that managers should focus only on 
demanding from contractors the performance targets truly related to the achievement of 
the fleet's operational mission, like aircraft availability or, ideally, mission readiness (the 
latter much more difficult to measure and demand from the contractor). When requiring 
performance parameters unrelated to the final objectives, there is a prospective risk of 
paying for additional logistical capacity that will be idle. 
Another potential problem related to adding unreasonable metrics to a 
performance-based contract can occur when payments are linked to meeting these 
performance goals. If the contractor fails to achieve such unnecessary intermediate 
targets, they may end up receiving less money in return for their services. And if they got 
less resources to invest in fleet support, they could perform even worse. As a result, their 
payments may be further reduced, and so on. This type of “death spiral” is encouraged 
when intermediate metrics are increasingly adopted in performance-based contracts. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Summary of the Research and Answers to Research Questions  
A simulation experiment was planned and successfully executed in this research, 
with the objective of providing quantitative evidence about the inherent mechanisms 
existing in a logistics support chain affected by changes in its operating parameters. The 
main idea was to replicate a possible performance-based contract design definition, in an 
attempt to show how the imposition of additional performance metrics could represent an 
additional challenge for contractors and costumers to achieve the desired results for an 
operational fleet.  
In seeking to answer the proposed research questions, it was possible to find 
indications that life support costs are strongly sensitive to the addition of new metrics to a 
performance-based contract, as was observed in the simulations when testing logistics 
responses to changes in turnaround times and repair costs. 
In most cases, the expenses to sustain the logistics system became higher when 
enforcing lower TAT, considering the related increases in repair costs to meet such 
demand. Nevertheless, it was also found the possibility of obtaining lower sustainment 
costs when requiring a lower time to get the components back from repair, but the 
conditions for this to occur are considered unlikely, requiring much faster deliveries with 
increases of only 5% in unit repair costs. 
For the conditions tested, more complex support organizations also performed 
better when subjected to changes in the mix TAT/repair costs, with slightly lower 
percentage increases in life support costs. And among all the tested logistics scenarios, 
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the one with fewer operational bases and depots, and more workshops, it was the one that 
presented a better combination between lower absolute LSC and response to fluctuations 
in escalating unit repair costs due to faster delivery obligations.  
Significance of Research  
There is a vast amount of literature addressing Performance Based Logistics and 
its correlated theme Performance Based Contracting, but at the same time a lack of 
quantitative studies within these areas.  
On the latter topic, much has been said about its possible benefits and how it can 
enhance the logistics chain to deliver better results than in the conventional transaction-
based approach, but scarce studies report the practical challenges associated with setting 
performance requirements. 
Hence, this research contributes by providing quantitative indications on the 
intrinsic mechanisms concerned with the contract design definitions, advising logistics 
managers with measurable evidence regarding the side effects that the imposition of 
performance metrics can have on life support costs.  
More than that, it offers an approach that can be reproduced in future studies that 
deal with complementary analysis on this subject, or even for leaders who seek to make 
more enlightened judgments in actual cases. 
Recommendations for Actions  
The main takeaway identified in this research is that decisions about performance 
metrics should be extremely cautious, given the inherent jeopardy associated with such 
additional requirements. Based on the findings reported here, evidence was produced 
indicating that performance-based contracts should preferentially define only goals more 
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directly related to the final objective of an aircraft fleet, like system availability or, 
ideally, mission readiness, which is harder to measure and demand from the contractor 
because it involves the uncertainty of operational schedule. 
If strictly necessary, intermediate metrics must be applied carefully and after a 
detailed assessment aiming to identify the current operating characteristic of the existing 
logistical support system, in an effort to eventually requiring, as far as possible, the 
maintenance of the ruling logistical parameters, avoiding a need for a sharp readjustment 
of the logistics support structure, thus reducing the possible negative effects of such in-
between metrics.   
Recommendations for Future Research  
Several improvements can be done using this study as a starting point. More 
specific logistics scenarios could be used, allowing bases to be used as warehouses or 
enabling lateral support, for example. Base and depot-level maintenance could also be 
added as possibilities in the logistics support structure. 
Different cost families could also be considered, adding depreciation rates, 
reorder costs, storage and transportation expenses, among others. Hereupon, this research 
did not consider the possible promising effects of the allowed inventory reduction 
induced by faster turnaround times, which would act positively by reducing, for instance, 
depreciation and storage costs. 
Also, the use of real data in the analysis would be a great challenge, for the 
reasons discussed in previous chapters, but it would certainly be an amazing opportunity 
for complementary research.  
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A final suggestion would be to expand this analysis to different types of metrics 
that could be used in performance-based contract, using different experiences from 
previous contracts. Thus, for example, in an agreement in which the contractor is 
responsible for carrying out all the maintenances of the aircraft, a metric that imposes a 
maximum period of time for each type of maintenance could certainly be specified by the 
procurement team. And this would be another interesting research case, which could be 
assessed employing the simulation tools used in this study or even another methodology. 
The risks in such situation would be similar to those faced in this research, but only a 
dedicated study would be able to identify whether the life support cost inherent in that 
support organization would be strongly affected by those metric changes or not. 
Conclusions of Research  
This study was able to provide evidences about the prospective side effects that 
may arise from unfounded decisions regarding performance metrics when designing a 
performance-based contract. It became clear by what means a simple change in the 
logistics system requirements can lead to a significant increase in life support costs, and 
how this effect can vary depending on the support organization structure. 
The rationale discussed in this research can guide administrators to make more 
informed judgments in the logistics support planning process. The specification of in-
between performance parameters may seem interesting and even tempting while 
negotiating performance-based agreements with contractors, giving the impression of 
creating a more robust supply chain.  
However, managers must keep in mind the potential risks of acquiring additional 
unused logistics capacity at a high price. In addition, if payments to the contractor are 
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penalized for not reaching such unnecessary goals, the logistics support may be not only 
more expensive, but can also be impaired in the medium to long-term, all of which result 
from a motivation without real need. 
Even in hypothetical scenarios where there is a theoretical possibility of reducing 
life support costs by adopting additional intermediate metrics, there will be some 
practical infeasibility in getting rid of the eventual extra allocation of inventory that will 
emerge with the adoption of improved logistics parameters. As a consequence, it is likely 
that the logistics system will end up with idle capacity, synonymous with inappropriate 
use of resources. 
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